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Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law 
 
Tim Wu† 
 
Abstract 
 
An increasingly large and important sector of the economy, including well-
known firms like Google and Facebook, now depends on attentional 
markets.  This development has created a blind spot that affects the 
antitrust and consumer protection laws, which are premised on cash 
markets and monetary harms. As a correction, this paper introduces a new 
means of assessing competition in attentional markets centered on 
“attention brokerage.”  In antitrust, it gives a better sense of the market 
power of contemporary firms like Facebook, whose power is mainly in 
attentional markets.  In the realm of consumer protection, it provides 
regulators with a paradigm for protecting captive audiences from cognitive 
impairments caused by non-consensual seizure of attention. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Human attention, both valuable and limited in supply, is a resource. It has 
become commonplace, especially in the media and technology industries, to speak of an 
“attention economy” and of competition in “attention markets.”1  There is even an 
attentional currency, the “basic attention token” (BAT) which purports to serve as a 
medium of exchange for user attention.2  Firms like Facebook and Google, which have 
emerged as two of the most important firms in the global economy, depend near-
exclusively on the attentional markets as a business model.3 
  
                                               
1 See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, The attention economy and the implosion of traditional media, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/12/attention-economy/. 
2 See BRAVE SOFTWARE, Basic Attention Token (BAT), May 29, 2017, 
https://basicattentiontoken.org/index/BasicAttentionTokenWhitePaper-4.pdf. 
3 See infra Section III.a.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941094 
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Yet despite the well-recognized commercial importance of attention markets, the 
law struggles when it encounters the attention economy.  In particular, the laws that 
emphasize consumer welfare – especially the antitrust laws and consumer protection 
regulations – have growing blind spots caused by this challenge.4  Antitrust agencies 
currently lack tools for assessing a firm like Google or Facebook, whose power lies in 
attention markets.  When faced with mergers or potentially anti-competitive conduct in 
this space, the antitrust agencies have struggled to come up with an analysis that gives 
appropriate weight to attentional power.5   
 
Meanwhile, the agencies tasked with consumer protection, such as the Federal 
Trade Commission, Department of Transportation, or the State Attorney Generals, have 
no good paradigm for dealing with some of today’s attentional intrusions6 – those 
intrusions which seize time and attention, causing cognitive impairment as opposed to 
financial injury.  In controversies surrounding telephony on airlines, or non-consensual 
and intrusive advertising, the agencies are reduced to considerations of “deception” or 
financial loss,7 which are inapposite to the harms complained of and the challenge 
presented.   
 
This essay aims to provide a legal and economic analysis to help face the 
challenges here described.  In other work, I have described the rise and spread of the 
“attentional industry,” the businesses that depend on the resale of attention.8  This essay 
builds on that work with a novel approach: a focus on the economic decisions implicit in 
“Attention Brokerage.”  As described here, brokerage is the resale of human attention.  It 
is to attract attention by offering something to the public (entertainment, news, free 
services and so on), and then reselling that attention to advertisers for cash.  Examples of 
pure Attention Brokers include social media companies like Instagram and Facebook, 
search engines like Google or Bing, ad-supported publishers like Buzzfeed or AM News, 
and some television channels like CBS or NBC.  The Broker’s activities are critical to the 
operation of attention markets, for the business model creates much of the competition 
for attention that this paper describes.9  
 
                                               
4 See infra Sections II.a, IV.A, IVB. 
5 See infra Section IV.A. 
6 See infra Sections II.b, IV.B. 
7 See infra Sections II.b, IV.B.  
8 See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR HEADS (2016).  
9 See infra Part III.  
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 As applied to antitrust, a focus on attention brokerage makes possible an analysis 
based on attentional markets that weighs time spent (a proxy for attention) as the 
appropriate means of measuring market power.  This metric gives a different, and 
arguably more accurate picture of industries like social media, and is therefore important 
for analysis of future mergers or any broader case alleging anticompetitive monopoly 
maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act.  For consumer protection, while the 
intrusions described here are the subject of consumer complaints,10 the analysis used 
here gives regulators a more concrete approach to assessing harms that are not financial 
or deceptive but related to seizure of consumer attention as a resource.  
 
This Essay begins in Part I by introducing the core challenges raised by attention 
markets, and then explaining the value of attention and its relationship to traditional 
models of advertisement.  Part II develops the business model of the Attention Broker 
and discusses pricing decisions and competition in attentional markets.  In Part III, I 
describe the legal implications of attentional analysis, and explain how an approach 
focused on attentional models and metrics provides regulatory authorities with useful 
tools to protect the public and to address the antitrust and regulatory problems 
introduced below.  
  
II. Background 
 
a. The Blind Spot 
 
We may begin with two legal problems, one from antitrust, one regulatory, that 
demonstrate the challenges that attentional markets create for current laws designed to 
protect consumers.  Antitrust doctrine is centered on “market power,” and markets are 
generally presupposed to be cash markets where customers spend fiat currency to buy 
goods or services.11  Consumer harm, under this approach, is primarily measured in 
terms of higher prices, reduced output, or other money-related harms.  Unfortunately, 
this approach, if reasonable for other industries, has a problematic blind spot when the 
companies in question give away their products for “free” and are, in fact, competing in 
attentional markets.12    
 
                                               
10 See infra note 38 and accompanying text.  
11 See infra Section IV.A.a. 
12 This paper is not the only work to notice the problem with merger review in this area.  For 
example, Maurice Stucke & Allen Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy, ch. 7 (2016), argue that 
merger review of many tech mergers fails to take into account the competitive impacts of “big data.” 
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We can see evidence of the blind spot by examining a merger between two social 
media companies, like the 2012 merger between Facebook and Instagram.13  Given that 
both are social media networks, but that neither company seems to charge end-
consumers for their products, the traditional tools for assessing potential market harm 
can yield inaccurate results.  As we have suggested, if consumers don’t “buy” Facebook 
or Instagram, then how can traditional economic tools tell us whether Facebook or 
Instagram are in competition at the consumer level? 
 
Existing antitrust practice does have some answers to this question, but, as we 
shall see by looking at that very merger, those answers are unsatisfying.  While the 
American agencies keep their analysis secret, the British Office of Fair Trading did 
release its reasoning and it is, in retrospect, riddled with errors and absurdities.14  The 
office approved the merger based on two main premises.  The first was that Facebook 
did not have an important photo-taking app, meaning that Facebook was not a serious 
competitor to Instagram in consumer markets.15  Second, the office observed that (at the 
time) Instagram was not yet earning advertising revenue, meaning that Instagram was 
not an important competitor to Facebook for advertisers.16  Hence, based on an analysis 
premised upon traditional cash markets, the companies were not competitors, allowing 
the office to safely conclude that “no substantial competition concerns arise.”17 
 
It may be unfair to ridicule a decision made some years ago, but even at the time 
there was something clearly missing.  Mergers are supposed to be illegal (both under 
U.S. law, and a substantially similar UK standard) when their effect is to “substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”18  Among other things, merger 
review is supposed to prevent a firm from eliminating “maverick” competitors – those 
                                               
13 The Facebook-Instagram merger was approved in August 2012.  See Julie Bort, The FTC Approves 
Facebook’s Purchase of Instagram, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
ftc-approves-facebooks-purchase-of-instragram-2012-8. 
14 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ME/5525/12, Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc of Instagram Inc 
(Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160815232112/https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/me
dia/555de2e5ed915d7ae200003b/facebook.pdf. 
15 Id at 4-5. 
16 Id at 5-6.  
17 Id at 3. 
18 15 U.S.C § 18. The Office of Fair Trading was supposed to act when a merger would cause a 
"substantial lessening of competition within a market or markets in the United Kingdom.” A. NIGEL PARR, 
ROGER J. FINBOW & MATTHEW J. HUGHE, UK MERGER CONTROL: LAW AND PRACTICE 223 (2005). 
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that introduce new technologies or business models – that might threaten the 
incumbent.19   
 
That “maverick” description fit Instagram, who was once Facebook’s greatest 
potential rival in the social media attention markets.  Back in 2012, both firms already 
held large shares of the attention devoted to social media, and both were competing for 
much the same attention – the same hours – that consumers might devote to such 
things.20  While they were not competing on price (yet), they were competing for another 
metric:  attention, measured by user time spent on their sites. And having already gained 
30 million users, Instagram was poised to become the leading challenger to Facebook 
based on its strength on mobile platforms, where Facebook was weak.21  
 
In retrospect, it seems clear that the antitrust authorities unconditionally allowed 
Facebook to buy one of its most dangerous competitors, and thereby helped the firm 
insulate itself from effective competition.  It is telling that business analysts thought this 
obvious at the time.  Nicholas Carlson immediately pointed out that Instagram was 
Facebook’s greatest competitive threat.22  And as TIME wrote in a 2016 retrospective, 
“Buying Instagram conveyed to investors that the company was serious about 
dominating the mobile ecosystem while also neutralizing a nascent competitor.”23 
 
Whether or not the antitrust authorities should have blocked the merger, their 
failure to take it seriously reveals the blind spot here described, a problem only 
confirmed by the subsequent approval of similar mergers.  For example, in 2013 Google 
acquired Waze, creating an apparent monopoly in online mapping and navigation, in a 
                                               
19 See 2010 Merger Guidelines, supra note 63, §2.1.5; Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, 
Promoting Innovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2223 (2015) (describing a Schumpeterian approach to merger 
review).  
20 One may also approach the question by asking what the respective market share of the 
advertising markets would be.  Indeed, while the proceedings were secret, it was widely speculated that 
Instagram’s lack of advertising revenue at the time it was acquired was an important reason for allowing 
the merger to proceed.  See Josh Constine, Why The OFT And FTC Let Facebook Buy Instagram: FB Camera 
Is Tiny, IG Makes No Money, And Google, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 22, 2012), 
https://techcrunch.com/2012/08/22/ftc-facebook-instagram.  
21 See Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion, N.Y.TIMES (Apr. 9, 2012), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/facebook-buys-instagram-for-1-billion. 
22 See Nicholas Carlson, Instagram Was Facebook’s Biggest Threat, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2012), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/instagram-was-facebooks-biggest-threat-2012-4. 
23 See Victor Luckerson, Here’s Proof That Instagram Was One of the Smartest Acquisitions Ever, TIME 
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://time.com/4299297/instagram-facebook-revenue. 
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deal quickly approved by the FTC.24  In 2014 Facebook acquired the messaging app 
WhatsApp, another potential competitor as a rival social network.25  When it came to the 
WhatsApp merger, business analysts once again had no difficulty that an anticompetitive 
strategy appeared to be driving the WhatsApp acquisition: 
 
WhatsApp's growth is gobbling up user messaging and connection time that once 
could have belonged to Facebook.  Now those users and their time do belong to 
Facebook.  So buying WhatsApp allows Facebook to both own ‘the next Facebook’ 
and prevent ‘the next Facebook from eating Facebook's lunch.’26 
 
When an anticompetitive potential and effect is blatantly obvious to industry observers 
yet somehow invisible to antitrust enforcers, something may be wrong.  As this paper 
suggests, what is missing is the ability to understand that firms are in fact competing in 
attentional markets and to countenance the effects of a merger in those terms.  Agencies 
and courts need a better analysis – at a minimum for future review, or even for 
retrospective review of consummated mergers. 
 
 This is not a problem isolated to merger analysis.  Any case considering whether 
the conduct of an attention broker constitutes monopoly maintenance in violation of the 
Sherman Act would also face the challenge that the product is “free” and any foreclosed 
competition may be in attentional markets.27  The same goes for investigations of 
collusive behavior under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.  In short, the blind spot may 
yield an unwarranted immunity to antitrust for firms operating in the attentional 
economy.   
 
What is needed is an approach to attentional markets that gives the antitrust 
agencies the ability to consider the concepts currently used in cash markets:  that is, 
crucial concepts like “market power,” “pricing,” “market entry” and product substitution.    
It is the goal of this essay to introduce tools and approaches, centered on a new model of 
attention markets and attention brokerage, that may help. 
 
                                               
24 See Melissa Grey, FTC will not challenge Google's $1 billion Waze acquisition, ENGADGET (Oct. 1, 
2013), https://www.engadget.com/2013/10/01/ftc-will-not-challenge-google-waze-acquisition/. 
25 See Parmy Olson, Facebook closes $19 billion WhatsApp deal, FORBES (Oct. 6, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/10/06/facebook-closes-19-billion-whatsapp-
deal/#7885fbf45c66. 
26 See Henry Blodget Everyone Who Thinks Facebook Is Stupid To Buy WhatsApp For $19 Billion 
Should Think Again, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-facebook-
buying-whatsapp-2014-2. 
27 See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.  
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b. Attentional Harms  
 
In addition to shortcomings in the antitrust law, this Essay will also examine the 
current weaknesses of regulatory and consumer protection mandates to address the 
problem of attentional intrusions and so-called “attention theft.”  The proliferation of 
phones, other mobile devices and screens has, over the last decade, raised a new series 
of questions about the protection of the public from unwanted and non-consensual 
bombardment with undesired information. Today, with some frequency, the public finds 
itself a captive audience, and sometimes cannot voluntarily avoid “attentional intrusions” 
– whether deliberate, from advertising, or inadvertent, from other people. 28  Regulators, 
however, don’t have a paradigm for thinking about consumer harms that are not 
deceptive or involve physical or financial harm, but rather arise from the seizure of 
attention and consequential cognitive impairments.29 
 
Attention theft is relevant to contemporary regulatory debates such as that 
centering on the conditions of air travel.  In 2016, the Department of Transportation 
opened a proceeding regarding the use of telephones or other telephony devices on 
passenger airplanes.30  There has long been a ban on cell phone usage on airplanes 
justified by potential interference with traffic control communications, but changes in 
technologies, including the introduction of WiFi on flights, have renewed the question of 
what might justify a ban on airplane telephony.31  
 
For problems like this, which evoke considerable public interest and comment,32 
current regulatory paradigms do not give consumer protection agencies like the 
Department of Transportation a good handle on how to think about these challenges.  As 
it stands, the regulatory debate over the cell phone ban on planes has focused on the 
                                               
28 See discussion infra Section III.B.  
29 See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
30 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT 152-16, DOT Proposes Rule to Protect Airline Passengers From 
Being Unwillingly Exposed to Voice Calls on Aircraft (Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot-proposes-rule-protect-airline-passengers-being-
unwillingly-exposed-voice-calls. 
31 Among other reasons, because WiFi availability provides a new means of making phone calls.  In 
2013, the FCC also considered lifting the cell phone ban based on the idea that the interference rationale 
was obsolete.  See Marguerite Reardon, FCC considers lifting cell phone ban on planes, CNET (Nov. 21, 
2013), https://www.cnet.com/news/fcc-considers-lifting-cell-phone-ban-on-planes.  
32 See Bart Jansen, Wi-Fi calls on planes OK? Answer is loud and clear: No, USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/02/12/plane-flights-voice-calls/97822422/. 
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inapposite concepts of “consumer deception” as against “letting the market decide.”33  A 
deception framework was, consequently, relied upon by the Department’s 2016 proposed 
rule that would have allowed telephone calls pursuant to “notice” – a requirement that 
airlines disclose that passengers will be exposed to phone conversations.34  The agency 
concluded that “consumers would be unfairly surprised if they learned for the first time, 
after purchasing the ticket, that their chosen flight permits voice calls. The proposed 
requirements are designed to ensure that consumers are adequately informed, in 
advance, that voice calls will be permitted.”35 
 
To say that this did not address the public’s concerns would be an 
understatement.  The public and other groups, like flight attendants,36 were not 
complaining about deception, but making a more obvious point (sometimes in in vivid 
terms):  that allowing phone calls would be, in effect, injurious.  In a typical comment, “I 
cannot imagine the stress, disruption and rage that voice calls will create on an 
airplane…”;37 or another “Can you imagine hundreds of people confined in a small space 
all yelling into their phones for the entire duration of a flight?"38  The agency itself 
estimated that 96% of the comments received since it proposed new rules have 
supported a full ban on telephony on airplanes.39 
 
What has been missing from the debate is some more concrete means of capturing 
the injury which passengers are complaining about.  However vividly phrased, the 
consumer complaints do not manage to suggest harm in a manner that federal consumer 
protection agencies are equipped to process.40  This paper provides a more concrete 
framework for considering the harm in attentional terms – as the non-consensual seizure 
of the scarce resource of attention, yielding cognitive impairment.  Based on what is 
known about the science of attention, telephone calls and advertisements with motion 
and sound are extremely difficult if not impossible to ignore due to the involuntary 
attentional responses of the brain.41  There is even a literature studying the particular 
effects of overheard telephone conversations on attention, memory, and cognitive 
                                               
33 For a summary of comments, see Use of Mobile Wireless Devices for Voice Calls on Aircraft, 81 
Fed. Reg. 90258 (Dec. 14, 2016) (notice of proposed rulemaking). 
34 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRASP., supra note 30.  
35 See supra note 33.   
36 See summary of comments, supra note 33.  
37 See Jansen, supra note 32.  
38 Anonymous Comment on Proposed Rule to Limit the Use of Mobile Wireless Devices for Voice 
Calls on Aircraft (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2014-0002-3735.  
39 See supra note 33.  
40 See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.  
41 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.  
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abilities.42  By adopting such tools and scientific research, the regulatory agencies might 
better fulfill their mandate of protecting consumers. 
 
In both antitrust and consumer protection, the conclusion is the same: to do their 
jobs, agencies, legislatures and courts need a better understanding of attentional 
markets.  To better develop this potentially unfamiliar concept, we turn now to an 
examination of attention itself, the rise of the attentional industry, and the economic 
model of attention brokerage. 
 
c. Attention and How it is Spent 
 
What is attention?  The question has interested philosophers, scientists and 
religious thinkers for quite some time.  It is often the case that by the word “attention,” 
different people mean completely different things, for at its very broadest, the study of 
attention is the study of conscious experience and our very sense of existence.43      
 
This Essay takes as its starting point the classic and very workable definition 
found in the writings of psychologist and philosopher William James.  In 1890, James 
described attention as the brain’s “cursor,” that is, the facility by which some selected 
stream of information gains access to the brain.  As he put it: “Everyone knows what 
attention is.  It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out 
of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought.”44 
  
 Over the last several decades, scientists have largely confirmed the physical basis 
for the James model.45  We have brains with a limited capacity to process information, 
and we exist in an environment limited by time – 168 hours per week.  Our brains are 
                                               
42 See, e.g., Veronica V. Galván et al., The Effects of Cell Phone Conversations on the Attention and 
Memory of Bystanders, PLOS ONE (March 13, 2013), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0058579; Lauren L. Emberson et al., 
Overhead Cell Phone Conversations: When Less Speech is More Distracting, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 10 (March 30, 
2010); Andrew Monk et al., Why are mobile phones annoying, 23 BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 1, 23, 33-41 (2004). 
 
43 One author notes that the following words are sometimes considered synonyms for attention: 
“arousal, effort, capacity, perceptual set, control, and consciousness.”   EDWARD SMITH, COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY: MIND AND BRAIN 105 (2006). 
44 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 403-04 (1890).  This definition helps explain 
James’s point that his life experience is “what I agree to attend to.” Id. at 402. 
45  Typical summaries of the attentional model can be found in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF 
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION ch. 9 (E. Bruce Goldstein ed. 2004); MICHAEL I. POSNER, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
OF ATTENTION (2d ed. 2011); EDWARD E. SMITH & STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: MIND AND 
BRAIN ch. 3 (2006). 
Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law 
11 
presented with too much information (by the sense organs) for the brain to process (ten 
million bits per second, by one estimate).46  In the same way that our skin creates a 
physical barrier between ourselves and the outside world, the attention system of the 
brain does the same thing with information.  Without filtering out most information, we 
would be unable to function, and in some sense unable to think.  Consequently, we 
ignore, or filter, almost everything, focusing attention on only a tiny subset of the 
information made available. 47  A well-known demonstration of this fact was the 
“invisible gorilla” experiment, wherein participants asked to count basketball passes 
generally failed to notice a man with a gorilla suit wandering across the screen and 
pausing to beat his chest.48  While attending to one thing, we can become blind to others. 
 
 Yet even if filtering most things, we are always processing information, or paying 
attention to something.  Attention cannot be stored or hold its value to be used later in 
time.  This is one way that attention is very different than a traditional currency (though 
some quasi-currencies, like frequent flier miles, may also disappear if not spent).  The 
fact that we ignore nearly everything provides an initial sense of why attention is a 
scarce resource.  It also explains the importance of the “attentional decision.”49  To 
allocate attention, our brain has means by which it decides to what streams of 
information, among the various choices, we will attend, or process.  Scientists have 
discovered at least two different mechanisms for making those “attentional decisions.”50  
There is an involuntary mechanism, located in the lower parts of the brain, and a 
voluntary mechanism, whose operation relies on the upper parts of the brain.51    
                                               
46 Kristin Koch et al., Efficiency of Information Transmission by Retinal Ganglion Cells, 14 CURRENT 
BIOLOGY 1523 (2004); see also THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES ch. 47 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 2000). 
47 For a review of competing theories of processing capacity, see Sarter et al., More attention must 
be paid: The neurobiology of attentional effort, 51 BRAIN RESEARCH REVIEWS 145 (2006). 
48  See Christopher Chabris & Daniel Simons, Gorillas in our midst: sustained inattentional blindness 
for dynamic events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059 (1999); CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE 
GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US (2010). 
49  In the economic and legal analysis of attention, it is useful to focus on the underlying capacity 
to process information.  Accordingly, in this Essay, I will refer to “attention” as the processing capacity of 
the human mind, and the “attentional decision” as the decision of what stream of information to process.     
In this usage, a man watching television for 30 minutes, say, has made the attentional decision to “spend” 
attention on Gilligan’s Island or whatever other show he has selected. 
50 See Timothy J. Buschhman & Earl K. Miller, Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Control of Attention in 
the Prefrontal and Posterior Parietal Cortices, 315 SCIENCE 1860 (2007). 
51  SMITH & KOSSLYN, supra note 45, at ch. 3 gives a straightforward explanation of the “top down” 
and “bottom up” attentional model.  The voluntary system, also described as "top-down" or "goal driven," is 
within our conscious control.  We can decide, if imperfectly, what information to pay attention to.  The 
words you are looking at right now cannot be understood unless you activate top-down attentional 
processing.  You might direct it elsewhere—to the feeling of your feet in your shoes, or what a dinnertime 
companion is saying, or the peculiar shape of a cloud in the sky.  We often say that we have decided to 
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 The fact that attention can be seized in an involuntary fashion is important and 
relevant to the discussion of attentional larceny and related concepts later in this paper.  
Certain triggers – moving images, loud noises, bright colors – will attract attention 
without a voluntary decision being made.52  The reaction, as scientists have shown, is 
automatic and like a reflex.53  Hence, the attention that is spent this way cannot be 
described as consensual, at least in the sense of chosen. 
 
How do we (the audience) decide what to spend attention on?  The constant 
spending is directed, on a second-by-second basis, by the attentional decisions that have 
been carefully studied by neuroscientists.54  As such, the decisions are not necessarily 
that different than how people spend money in traditional cash markets.  In any event, 
attentional spending, like the spending of currency, is dictated by preferences (HBO 
versus MTV; Fox News versus MSNBC); various habits and rituals (spending “prime 
time” with the television, or “checking-in” to email or Twitter); and other considerations 
created largely by our technological environment (consider how you spend attention 
differently while carrying a smartphone; or on a day spent camping as opposed to in an 
office).   
 
 Summing up, the biology of human attention suggests three important facts.   
First, that we are always paying attention to something.  Second, that our attention is 
scarce – limited by the processing power of the brain, and by time – the 168 hours per 
week that we are allotted.  Finally, that we make “attentional decisions” – that we decide 
to pay attention to some things, while ignoring others.  These three basic facts help us 
understand why attention is a scarce resource.  They suggest that the spender of 
attention is like a man with a large supply of gold dust in a pocket with a small hole at 
the bottom that leaks at a constant rate, enriching whichever place he chooses to spend 
his time.  This admittedly odd analogy helps capture how attention is spent. 55  And we 
                                               
“pay attention” to something.  But attention is also subject to involuntary control.  The involuntary system, 
also called "bottom-up" or "stimulus-driven," is activated by lower parts of the brain outside of conscious 
control.  Research suggests our brains are involuntarily responsive to properties inherent in certain forms 
of information:  loud noises, flashing lights, and rapid movement.  “Saliency” is a word used in the 
scientific literature to describe these triggers.  The bottom-up system is also responsive to some learned 
stimuli like food, familiar faces, sexual targets, and the like.  These facts may help explain the chosen 
subject of many advertising posters.  
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. at 3-5 for an analysis of how attentional decisions are made. 
55 Another metaphor is GEORGE BARR MCCUTCHEON, BREWSTER'S MILLIONS (1902), where a man was 
required to spend $1 million within a year to inherit $7 million. 
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can now see that our attentional decisions can be compared to other consumer decisions, 
such as spending money.  
 
d. Caveats 
 
 This model of the attentional spending has the advantage of being simple, but it 
also makes two slightly unrealistic assumptions.  First, the model assumes that 
everyone’s attention is worth roughly the same.  Sometimes, advertisers do treat 
everyone as roughly the same, particularly for mass-media events (like the Super Bowl, 
the Academy Awards, and so on).  However, in practice the attention of different people 
is valued differently in the marketplace, both as an absolute matter and depending on 
the product.  For many decades, those buying attention have tended to prefer access to 
minds that are younger and wealthier (the so-called 19-49 demographic).56  O Magazine, 
(owned by Oprah Winfrey) tells advertisers it “reaches 1 in 14 women in America and 
more adults 18-49 than Modern Family, The Bachelor, and How To Get Away With 
Murder.”57  Sellers of particular products or political buyers of attention may value 
specific access to potential demographic niches:  women or men, likely-voters, parents 
expecting a new child, and so on.  Guns & Ammo magazine, for instance, provides 
advertisers with access to ten million readers, who spend an average of $233 per year on 
hunting apparel, and 82% of whom buy their own motor oil.58  Their attention is 
obviously more valuable to some than others.  In short, the material falling out of the 
pocket may be gold to one advertiser, but merely silver to another, and worthless to a 
third.  
  
 Second, the model unrealistically values access to all mental states equally.  In 
reality, certain mental states are considered more valuable – for example, the customer 
who is looking for something (i.e., “searching”), the customer who is in a receptive mood 
after having watched an enjoyable comedy show, the customer who is sitting with his 
family, and so on.  Spirit Airlines, which sells advertising on seatbacks and other places, 
writes, “86% of in-flight customers are in a positive frame of mind; hence, they will be 
                                               
56 See Frank Ahrens, Networks Debate Age Groups’ Value to Advertisers, WASHINGTON POST (May 21, 
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44031-2004May20.html.  
57 2017 O Magazine Media Kit, O MAGAZINE, 
http://www.omediakit.com/hotdata/publishers/oprahmaga3395825/omediakit7535/pdfs/Media-Kit-
2017_FULL.pdf.   
58 2016 Guns & Ammo Media Kit, GUNS & AMMO, http://www.outdoorsg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/2016_Guns-Ammo_MediaKit.pdf.  
Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law 
14 
receptive to advertising messages.”59  Once again, those Attention Brokers who can 
provide access to specific mental states tend to sell them at a premium.60  As I shall 
suggest below, a more advanced model of the Attention Broker suggests an entity who 
not only resells attention, but resells very specific types of attention according to the 
demands of advertisers or others who wish to reach a targeted audience.  Like any 
sophisticated broker of a product, he or she promises access to a broad range of minds 
and mental states. 
 
 With our basic model of attentional spending, we now turn to advertising and 
attentional brokerage – the business model of that consists of converting attention into 
cash.    
 
e. Advertising and the Value of Attention 
 
 That human attention is valuable is perhaps most easily captured by how much 
firms are willing to pay for it.  Globally, over $500 billion was spent on advertising in 
2015, and $180 billion in the United States alone.61  The analysis of attention just 
completed helps explain just what advertisers are paying for:  access to the minds of 
consumers.    
    
 But why is that access valuable?  Just what do advertisers do with the audience 
attention?   The most straightforward answer is that firms value advertising for its ability 
to influence demand –  by creating or influencing demand for their products, or 
potentially suppressing demand for competing products.  Economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith was perhaps most straightforward about this point in his 1958 work The 
Affluent Society, where he stated that advertising’s “central function is to create desires – 
to bring into being wants that previously did not exist.”62  In Galbraith’s account, such a 
function became understood as necessary in an affluent society that had already satisfied 
most of its basic needs.  “As society becomes increasingly affluent,” he noted, “wants are 
increasingly created by the process by which they are satisfied.”63      
                                               
59 Q Media Research 2007, GLOBAL ONBOARD PARTNERS, 
http://www.globalonboardpartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/effectiveness_presentation.pdf. 
60 See discussion infra at Section III.a. 
61  Sydney Ember, Digital Ad Spending Expected to Soon Surpass TV, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/business/media/digital-ad-spending-expected-to-soon-surpass-
tv.html.  Some economists argue that as much as 25% of GDP is spent on “persuasion.”  Donald McCloskey 
& Arjo Klamer, One Quarter of GDP is Persuasion, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 191 (1995). 
62 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY, 127 (1998). 
63 Id.  
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 By this theory, advertising can shape demand (people already want to eat; 
advertising creates a demand for burgers), or sometimes create product demand outright 
(few of us are born with an identifiable demand for a product like a mouthwash, but we 
might later find that we want it).64  Moving beyond this observation, over the last 
century economists have proposed alternative theories of what advertising 
accomplishes.65  Some of the early, competition-driven theories of advertising suggested 
that many advertisements were a means to persuade a customer to prefer one brand over 
another (say, Coke over Pepsi, or both over an unknown soft drink), irrespective of the 
merits of the underlying product.66  Economically speaking, the goal and effect was to 
influence the elasticity of demand, making it possible to maintain higher prices.  A 
customer who constantly consumes advertisements about the distinctive appeal of 
Marlboro cigarettes, for example, might be unwilling to switch to another brand, even if 
cheaper.  Economic studies confirm consumers will pay more for sodium hypochlorite 
solution when it is branded “Clorox bleach.”67  
 
     The branding theory might explain why Pepsi, over the 1950s, despite being far 
cheaper and offering a similar product, nonetheless could not gain market share against 
Coca-Cola.68  Coke, in the 1950s, had the reputation as the “brand beyond 
competition.”69  Its advertisements had succeeded not just in persuading consumers, but 
in ensnaring them, creating a brand loyalty that defied the usual assumptions of 
microeconomics.70  This view of advertising led to the conclusion that advertising could 
serve anti-competitive purposes because it deterred switching between products. 
 
                                               
64 There was once (and there may remain) resistance among some economists to the theory that 
advertising can influence demand, a matter discussed at some length by GALBRAITH, supra note 62. 
65 See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1701-1844 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter, eds., 2007). 
66 Id.  
67 WILLIAM S. BROWN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 316 (1995). 
68 See BOB BATCHELOR, AMERICAN POP: POPULAR CULTURE DECADE BY DECADE 345 (2009) (noting that, 
in the early 1950s, Coca-Cola “claimed 69 percent of the U.S. market, whereas Pepsi-Cola could only 
attract about 15 percent,” with Pepsi’s marketing efforts throughout the decade narrowing Coke’s lead only 
“somewhat”); see also WILLIAM H. YOUNG & NANCY K. YOUNG, THE 1950S 111 (2004) (“A strong television 
marketing campaign by Pepsi throughout the fifties narrowed Coca-Cola’s lead somewhat, but it remained 
mired in second place.  Coke was truly the drink of choice for millions.”). 
69 BARTOW J. ELMORE, CITIZEN COKE: THE MAKING OF COCA-COLA CAPITALISM 151 (2015) (noting that, 
in 1950, “Coke was an unrivaled global brand, dominant in all corners of the world”).  
70 The Pepsi challenge - a blind taste test - sought to demonstrate to consumers that they actually 
preferred the taste of Pepsi, and were therefore irrationally drinking Coke as a matter of brand loyalty. 
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Another, and perhaps most straightforward theory of advertising suggests that 
advertising just provides information that can be important to consumers making 
decisions (e.g., Geico’s “15 minutes could save you up to 15%” or “Coming Soon:  Star 
Wars Part VIII”).71  Under this theory, advertising exists to deal with missing consumer 
information, and thereby helps solve market imperfections.  Finally, a theory pioneered 
in the 1990s, primarily by Gary Becker and various co-authors, saw advertising as a 
complement to products (something that makes them more valuable).72  By this analysis, 
for example, billboards for Mercedes-Benz automobiles or Calvin Klein clothing serve to 
make those products more valuable to their owners, thereby justifying the firm’s 
advertising expense. 
 
 As the examples show, it seems possible that different advertisements for different 
products might serve different functions.  A new product might need to create demand; 
another to reinforce it; another to reward consumers who already own the product.  
Regardless of which theory has the greatest empirical support,73 the relationship of each 
to the market for human attention should be clear.  They tend to explain why businesses 
would find access to human attention valuable, for the access to the mind can be used to 
influence the demand curve for their products — whether by making the brand more 
desirable, or by giving the customer information that he would not otherwise have. 
 
 With this understanding of why advertisers value human attention, we now turn 
to the model of attentional brokerage that is central to this paper, and develop the 
equivalents of pricing, market entry, market definition and other concepts. 
 
III. Attentional Markets, Brokers, and Competition 
 
a. The Rise of the Attentional Industry 
 
 In the 1830s, a group of newspapers in New York City, led by the New York Sun, 
pioneered a business model here described as “Attention Brokerage.”74  The newspapers 
were sold for a penny, which was below the cost of printing.  However, the papers 
                                               
71 See S.A. Ozga, Imperfect Markets Through Lack of Knowledge, 74 Q.J. ECON. 29 (1960); George 
J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). 
72 Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising As Good or Bad, 108 Q.J. 
ECON. 941 (1993). 
73 See Bagwell, supra note 65.  
74 For a history of the Penny Press, see SUSAN THOMPSON, THE PENNY PRESS: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
MODERN NEWS MEDIA 1833–1861 (2004).  The Attention Brokerage model is introduced in WU, supra note 
8.  
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nonetheless turned a profit by attracting larger audiences and reselling their attention to 
advertisers.    
 
 As I describe more fully in The Attention Merchants, the success of the New York 
Sun and other newspapers gradually led to the spread of the business model to a 
remarkable number of media and other industries.75  Briefly stated, after newspapers, the 
attention-brokerage business model spread to magazines, leapt to commercial 
broadcasting (radio and television), cable television, and has found its greatest impact in 
the web-based Internet industry, including industry leaders like Google and Facebook.76  
The purpose of this paper is not to retell that history, but rather to examine more 
carefully the economics of attention brokerage and its implications for laws that typically 
presume cash markets as opposed to attentional markets. 
 
In this paper, I refer to the business model of attention resale as “attention 
brokerage.”  In its purest form, these businesses rely solely on the resale of attention to 
make money.  Examples of pure attention brokers includes businesses such as broadcast 
television networks, free newspapers, and many of the companies on the World Wide 
Web, like Facebook or Google.  In economic terms, the Attention Broker can be described 
as a specialized version of a platform intermediary in a two-sided market.77  In the 
literature pioneered by economists Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, a platform 
intermediary is a firm that brings together buyers and sellers from two separate markets 
and facilitates their transactions.78  Classic examples include credit card companies, 
shopping malls, or online firms like eBay.  Each facilitates transactions by bringing 
together groups of buyers and sellers in one place or one format.  To facilitate 
transactions, moreover, the platforms often charge fees to only one side of the market 
(typically the seller) so as to attract more buyers.79 
 
It is important to recognize the similarities and differences between attention 
brokerage and the intermediaries in two-sided markets.  Like a typical platform, the 
Attention Broker brings together two groups:  the public, and attention seekers (like 
commercial advertisers, but also others, like politicians).  It also, as is typical for platform 
intermediaries, lowers its price to one side of the market (the public) by making its 
content appear free, and makes its profit on the other side (advertisers).    
                                               
75 See WU, supra note 8, Chs. 1-19. 
76 See id. Chs. 20-28. 
77 See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: An Overview, presented at The 
Economics of Two-Sided Markets, Toulouse, France, January 23–24, 2004.  
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
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But the differences are important, and caution against simplistic assumption of 
the economic model.  Most importantly, the Attention Broker sits at the juncture 
between two different types of markets— a money market on the one side, and an 
attention market on the other.  The Broker is bartering something desirable (the 
“honey”) for attention, and then reselling it for cash.  In this manner, the Attention 
Broker differs significantly from a typical intermediary like a shopping mall or credit card 
company.  Consider that a credit card company makes it easier for people to use money 
to buy goods and services.  That is quite different than an Attention Broker, who is 
attracting attention and reselling it, for cash, to advertisers.  The broker is therefore 
perhaps most accurately described as an unusual type of platform intermediary, situated 
between cash and attention markets, as pictured here. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Attention Broker’s Business Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Recalling an earlier illustration, we might think of the spender of attention as like 
a man with the large supply of gold dust leaking from his pocket at a constant rate.  This 
is the consumer, the spender of attention, whose very presence is valuable.  As he walks 
down the street, merchants (the Attention Brokers) might offer him free food, drinks or 
other enticements to lure the gentleman in, and then might charge the other patrons 
(the advertisers) extra for the opportunity to pick up some of the dust that falls as the 
man enjoys his drinks.  That, in a nutshell, is the business model of the Attention Broker. 
 
Attention Free goods/services 
The Public 
(Attention Providers) 
Attention Broker 
Attention Money 
Attention Seekers 
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 As suggested before, in a more advanced model, the Attention Broker resells not 
just attention in bulk, but specific, tailored tranches of attention designed to meet the 
needs of the buyer.  For example, one might buy access to male consumers who are in 
their 30s and considering life insurance for the first time, or a person with a specific 
injury looking for a plaintiff’s attorney, and so on.  Brokers also may specialize in the 
resale of particular mental states (looking for a product, wanting to buy, etc.).  The high-
tech Attention Brokers like Google and Facebook have made much of their ability to very 
precisely target the right audiences and the right states of mind.80 
 
b. Pricing Decisions in Attentional Markets 
 
Pricing is, of course, at the core of cash markets, so it is important to understand 
the equivalent of pricing decisions in attentional markets.  Once again, we focus on the 
key intermediary:  the Attention Broker.  In the course of competition, the Broker makes 
several price-setting decisions.  More precisely, it makes three key decisions.  At one 
level, the Broker sets the price of the “honey” — the service or good meant to attract the 
attention to be resold.  It often sets that price at zero to induce the largest possible 
audiences; but not always: most newspapers and magazines also charge subscriptions or 
per-issue charges.  Second, the Broker sets its advertising rates depending on its 
audience, the perceived desirability of that audience, and finally, some sense of the 
quality of their attention.    
 
The third, less familiar pricing decision, but the most important for our purposes, 
is the setting of an “attentional price.”  This usually involves deciding how much 
advertising to combine with desirable content.  The Attention Broker knows that it is the 
“honey” that attracts its audiences (the football game, newsfeed, or the search engine, 
for example).  Advertising, meanwhile, is usually a form of product degradation.  But the 
Broker’s cash revenue depends on the amount of advertising it can sell.  This leads it, 
logically, to want to set a mixture that will maximize its revenue without degrading the 
product too much and subsequently alienating consumers.  If a web page or television 
show were nothing but advertising, it might be expected to attract very few viewers.  On 
the other hand, displaying no ads will maximize viewership, but result in no revenue.  
The optimal price lies somewhere in between. 
  
                                               
80 See Ryan Singel, Analysis: Google’s ad targeting turns algorithms on you, WIRED (March 11, 
2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/03/google-ad-annou/. 
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This model helps explain why, since at least the 1970s or so, advertisers have 
tried with various degrees of success to create advertising that that audiences want to 
watch – or failing that, they have aimed for advertising that is at least not so annoying.81  
Logically, advertising is just a form of information, and therefore might be useful or 
otherwise desirable.82  Few people, for instance, complain about classified 
advertisements, or a coupon that comes at just the right time and saves you money.  If an 
advertiser manages to create advertising that is desirable, he erases the dilemma just 
described, and allows the resale of attention without extracting some cost from 
consumers.  
 
There are some well-known examples of advertising that have succeeded in 
minimizing or eliminating product degradation.  Super Bowl advertisements, for 
example, are widely watched for their entertainment value,83 and the advertisements in 
fashion magazines like Vogue are considered by many readers to be part of the 
attraction.84  At another level, music videos on networks like MTV are sometimes 
described as a form of advertising,85 while movies like Transformers or The Lego Movie 
can be seen as enjoyable advertisements for toys.86  The longstanding goal of “targeted” 
advertising on the web has been to display ads that users “want.”87    
 
All these efforts notwithstanding, it is far easier to say that advertising should be 
desirable than to make it so.  Advertising, to be effective, cannot aim merely to be 
enjoyable:  it needs to influence consumer demand for the product associated with it, 
which is a different goal than being entertaining.  For one thing, an advertisement may 
need to be repeated more times than anyone would like to drive home its message and 
                                               
81 For examples of efforts in this vein, see WU, supra note 8 at 179-180. 
82 As discussed in the informational theories of advertising, supra notes 71-72 and accompanying 
text. 
83 Robert Klara, Why the Super Bowl is the One Time of Year People Actually Want to Watch Ads, 
ADWEEK (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/why-the-super-bowl-is-the-one-time-
of-year-people-actually-want-to-watch-ads/. 
84 See, e.g., Meghan Blalock, Why I Think Ads Are the Best Part of Fashion Magazines, WHO WHAT 
WEAR (March 16, 2015), http://www.whowhatwear.com/fashion-magazine-ads. 
85 For the song itself, as well as other products. See Joseph Plambeck, Product Placement Grows in 
Music Videos, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/business/media/06adco.html. 
86 See Noah Kristula-Green, Opinion, The Lego Movie isn’t a great film, it’s a brilliant commercial, 
THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/19/lego-movie-
is-great-commerical. 
87 For a history of Google’s efforts to create desirable advertising see STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW 
GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES OUR LIVES 94 (2011). 
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be remembered by consumers when they open their wallets.88  Consequently, Attention 
Brokers are typically saddled with selling advertisements that will be taken by the 
audiences as degradation, and therefore face the pricing dilemma described above. 
 
c. Attention Broker Pricing Strategies & Market Entry 
 
 An analysis of the pricing strategies employed by Attention Brokers helps 
demonstrate the value of the brokerage model.  I have previously described how an 
Attention Broker, by deciding on the mixture of advertising and editorial, sets an 
attentional price.89  Within the industry, this mixture is known as the “advertising 
load.”90  But what strategies might Attention Brokers employ in this environment? 
 
The most obvious approach to Attention Broker pricing is the same as a traditional 
pricing strategy:  one tries to increase the price, or load, to the perceived point of 
consumer revolt.  And so, for example, American television programmers believe that the 
maximum for their medium is reached by devoting between 14-16 minutes per hour to 
advertising, and burying some further marketing time into the shows themselves.91  The 
end goal is to be able to sell roughly one quarter to one third of television time to 
advertisers.92  Similarly, while we lack a clear metric for measuring the density of ads on 
web sites, many web sites seem, by the mid-2010s at least, to have pushed up against the 
limits of consumer tolerance.93  
 
 But it is also possible to employ more dynamic strategies.  Over the 2000s 
Facebook introduced an interesting and successful variation.  Facebook, at its 
introduction and for many years following, minimized its advertising.94  According to one 
                                               
88 See Jeffry Pilcher, Say It Again: Messages Are More Effective When Repeated, THE FINANCIAL BRAND 
(Sept. 23, 2014), https://thefinancialbrand.com/42323/advertising-marketing-messages-effective-
frequency/. 
89 See supra Section III.b.   
90 For an example of use of the term in context, see the comparison between the Hulu and 
broadcasting advertising loads in ANITA ELBERSE, BLOCKBUSTERS: HIT-MAKING, RISK-TAKING, AND THE BIG 
BUSINESS OF ENTERTAINMENT 174 (2013). 
 
91 See Jon Swallen, Oscar takes home ad-spending gold, KANTAR (Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://www.us.kantar.com/tech/tv/2015/a-decade-of-tv-advertising-for-the-academy-awards/ (“Regular 
prime time entertainment programming typically has 14-16 minutes of national ads per hour.”). 
92 See Matthew P. McAllister, Television Advertising as Textual and Economic Systems, in A 
COMPANION TO TELEVISION 219 (Janet Wasko ed., 2009). 
93 See Kate Murphy, The Ad Blocking Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/opinion/sunday/the-ad-blocking-wars.html?_r=0. 
94 See DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 177 (2011). 
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account, Facebook ran ads only as necessary to cover liquidity shortfalls, and otherwise 
ran no advertisements at all.95  It did not, in other words, pursue revenue maximization, 
at least in the short term. 
 
 This strategy gave Facebook an immediate advantage over its main rivals, 
especially Myspace, which was, in contrast, following the traditional revenue 
maximization strategy and running as many ads as it could.96  Consequently, Facebook 
was, in the attentional terms used here, a lower price competitor to Myspace (even 
though, by traditional cash metrics, both were “free”).  Facebook had other advantages 
as well – better code, and more “real” users – but the effect of its pricing strategy cannot 
be ignored. 
 
 After achieving market power and extinguishing or buying its main rivals by the 
2010s,97 Facebook then began to raise its price by changing the mixture of advertising 
and native content.98  In other words, it then began to pursue a revenue-maximizing 
approach, and arguably began setting something closer to a monopoly price.99  As such, 
the overall dynamic pricing pattern resembles, in its rough contours, a predatory pricing 
strategy – the setting of a low price at an initial time period, followed later by monopoly 
pricing.100 
 
                                               
95 See id. 
96 Multiple sources confirm the profusion of advertising on MySpace during this period.  See, e.g.,  
JULIA ANGWIN, STEALING MYSPACE: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE MOST POPULAR WEBSITE IN AMERICA 243 (2009) 
(noting profusion of low-revenue ads); KIRKPATRICK, supra note 94, at 177 (describing a $900 million 
advertising deal MySpace made with Google in 2006); Felix Gillette, The Rise and Inglorious Fall of 
MySpace, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 22, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/11_27/b4235053917570.htm (explaining how the 
pressure to increase revenue led to a doubling in the amount of advertising in the mid-1990s). 
97 The acquisition of rivals Instagram and WhatsApp is discussed supra text accompanying notes 13 
to 26. 
98 See, e.g., Brittany Darwell, The Year in Facebook Advertising 2012, ADWEEK (Dec. 31, 2012), 
http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/the-year-in-facebook-advertising-2012/288561; J. O’Dell, Facebook 
has totally changed the mobile ad industry, caused 180% spend spike in 2012, VENTUREBEAT (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://venturebeat.com/2012/12/17/facebook-mobile-ads-boom/; Paul Tassi,  Facebook’s Advertising is 
Starting to Spiral Out of Control, FORBES (July 1, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/07/01/facebooks-advertising-is-starting-to-spiral-out-of-
control/#7cd83960204e. 
99 See Garett Sloane, Facebook Ad Prices Are Rising Amid Organic Reach Squeeze: 10 percent higher 
pricing in first quarter, ADWEEK (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/facebook-ad-
prices-are-rising-amid-organic-reach-squeeze-156888; see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 94, at ch. 13 
(discussing Facebook’s advertising strategy during this time). 
100 Predatory pricing is defined in WILLIAM GREENE, PREDATORY PRICING 2-3 (1993). 
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 Understanding the mixtures of advertising and native content as a form of price 
setting also can help us understand another phenomenon – user “revolts” against 
sponsored media, such as the rise of ad-blocking in the mid-2010s.101  The theory is that, 
as with standard prices, every consumer has a reserve price – a level at which he or she 
considers the amount of advertising mixed with native content to be unacceptable.  As 
with regular pricing, this can vary greatly by individual.    
 
 When her reserve price is exceeded, the consumer can be expected to abandon the 
product for that of a competitor, or revolt in other ways, such as installing ad-blocking 
software.102  Interestingly, consumers may not realize that this is, precisely, what they are 
doing; they may just notice that they have stopped watching broadcast television and 
started watching Netflix (which has no advertising).103 
 
 A final wrinkle in our model of the Attention Broker concerns market entry.  One 
implication of constant spending of attention is that an Attention Broker always faces an 
incumbent.  That is to say, attention is always being spent on something, and so the 
commercial entrant necessarily must displace something that already has some hold on 
the attention desired.  This might be thought of as historically occurring in one of two 
ways.  
 
Sometimes, a competitor in the attentional economy is trying to wrest specific 
blocks of time and attention from another Attention Broker.  This form of competition is 
familiar – it is the well-known competition for “ratings,” “eyeballs,” or “monthly unique 
visitors.”  Essentially, the competitors try to put up more alluring materials to capture 
audiences:  a pure form of this competition is seen when two television programs 
compete for viewers during the same time slot, like when NBC programmed its new 
police show Miami Vice against CBS’s established prime time soap opera Dallas in the 
1980s.104  On the web, similar such scenarios feature a challenger trying to take away 
                                               
101 See Murphy, supra note 93.   Such revolts are extensively detailed in WU, supra note 8. 
102 See The 2015 AdBlocking Report, PAGEFAIR (Aug. 10, 2015), https://blog.pagefair.com/2015/ad-
blocking-report/ (noting that ad blocking grew by 41% globally between 2014 and 2015). 
103 As argued in WU, supra note 8, at ch. 27.  There is also some evidence that Attention Brokers 
set different prices for different types of audiences, or in other words, employ price discrimination 
strategies.  We see this whenever the same content is offered with varying levels of advertising.  For 
example, the Forbes website, if it encounters an ad-blocker, offers to deliver an “advertising-lite” version of 
the site in exchange for the user turning off the ad-blocker.  The presence of such negotiations tends to 
suggest an effort to price discriminate, once again revealing a pricing mechanism in operation. 
104 See Kenneth Clark, Networks Put Big Guns Muzzle-to-muzzle In An All-out Ratings War, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE (May 27, 1986), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-05-27/features/8602070888_1_miami-
vice-time-slots-starman. 
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attention from an incumbent, such as search engine Bing’s effort to steal audiences from 
Google over the 2000s. 
 
 Another form of market entry is also important: the conquest of attentional 
“greenfields.”  Attentional greenfields, by my definition, refer to the time occupied by 
non-commercial providers. They are, in other words, the time and attention spent on 
friends, families, hobbies, taking walks and so on.  The 20th-century history of the 
attentional industries – the history of industrial expansion – is largely one of companies 
attracting attention that was previously spent on some non-commercial source.  There 
are many examples. Over the 1930s, during the invention of “prime time,” broadcasters 
learned that they could attract attention previously devoted to activities within the 
home.105  In the 1950s, during its competition with CBS, NBC took a greenfield strategy 
by introducing a “morning show” and “late night” television, two previously uncontested 
blocks of time.106  In our times, computers, phones and other devices have managed to 
contest nearly every waking period of time and attention, including that spent at work, 
waiting for things, and just about every other period imaginable.    
 
Understanding the greenfield strategy can help us understand why, for example, a 
company like Google, whose business is the resale of attention, might spend so much 
money on an apparently tangential invention like the self-driving car.107  The research 
effort makes more sense if one pauses to consider how much time and attention is 
currently spent driving.  An understanding of attentional markets makes it clear that the 
time and attention spent, say, navigating a left-hand turn, makes for a ripe opportunity.  
The capture of even some of that time may therefore justify current efforts to design self-
driving cars.  
 
With this understanding of the business strategies of the Attention Broker model 
and the resultant pervasiveness and omnipresence of the industry in everyday life, we 
now return to the legal problems posed by attentional markets.   
  
 
 
 
                                               
105 See WU, supra note 8. 
106 See HOWARD J. BLUMENTHAL & OLIVER R. GOODENOUGH, THIS BUSINESS OF TELEVISION: THE 
STANDARD GUIDE TO THE TELEVISION INDUSTRY 130 (3d ed. 2006). 
107 See Daisuke Wakabayashidec, Google Parent Company Spins Off Self-Driving Car Business, 
N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/technology/google-parent-company-
spins-off-waymo-self-driving-car-business.html. 
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IV. Antitrust and Consumer Protection 
 
A. Antitrust: The Attention Economy Blind Spot  
 
Many of the leading firms in the technology and media industries – Facebook, 
Google, the major television networks, and others – are driven by the attention 
brokerage described in this article.  As large and acquisitive companies, they are also 
subject to frequent antitrust scrutiny.108  However, as already suggested, the tools 
currently employed to try and understand the key issue of competitive effects are greatly 
hindered by a blind spot for the attentional markets that these actors compete in.  This 
section, after providing a brief introduction to the relevant law that can be skipped by 
experts, strongly suggests that antitrust enforcers should take attentional markets and 
metrics into consideration in the review of large mergers in this area, and also in 
monopolization and restraint-of-trade cases.  
 
d. Market Power and the Antitrust Laws 
 
In contemporary antitrust law, the concepts of the “market” and “market power” 
are both of central importance and among the most contested issues in any case.  That is 
because, with only a few exceptions (known as “per se” violations), antitrust doctrine 
now requires either proof or demonstrated likelihood of harm to competition before 
action will lie.109  The most straightforward means to prove or refute any theory of harm 
or potential harm is to assert or deny that the defendant, or defendants, possess enough 
economic power in their markets (known as “market power”) to influence prices or 
otherwise hurt competition.  Hence, for example, in a case alleging anticompetitive 
conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the defendant, if conceding that the 
conduct occurred, may deny that it had sufficient power to actually harm competition.110   
Similarly, in a typical merger case proceeding under the authority of the Clayton Act,111 
the government will allege that the combined entity, with an increased level of market 
                                               
108 See discussion of the Facebook-Instagram and Google-Waze mergers, supra notes 13-26 and 
accompanying text.  
109 In some scenarios harm is presumed.  The most prominent is price-fixing, or agreeing to set 
prices, which remains per se illegal, or illegal without proof of harm.  See United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
110 Technically, monopoly power, which is greater than market power, is required under United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).  
111 15 U.S.C § 18 (1988). In practice, the Merger Guidelines issued by the Justice Department and 
Federal Trade Commission govern merger review.  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE (Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.  
Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law 
26 
power, will be able to raise prices, exclude competitors, or otherwise damage 
competition in the market.  The defendant will usually insist that, even after the merger, 
the company will remain too powerless to actually do anything that might be harmful to 
competition.  All of these assertions depend on a key question:  does or will the entity 
have enough market power “to make a difference?”112  
  
The concept of economic or market power is, technically speaking, the power to 
raise prices above competitive levels, or otherwise influence markets.113  It reflects the 
intuition that there is something very different about what happens when a monopolist 
(say, Microsoft circa 1998) raises prices, as opposed to a business in a highly competitive 
market (say, a New York pizza restaurant).  The monopolist faces no competition, and 
will be able to sustain its price increase, and thereby hurt consumers.  In contrast, the 
pizza restaurant that operates in a market where $2 slices are the accepted price will 
only hurt itself by raising its price because consumers will patronize competitors 
instead.114 
 
Doctrinally, a market power element has been incorporated into the main tests 
that animate contemporary antitrust and merger practice. Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
bans “restraints of trade,” and the “rule of reason” analysis that is a mainstay of § 1 
                                               
112 California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
113 The implication is that lacking such power, a firm would be constrained by market competition.  
For a much more detailed introduction, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market 
Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987). 
114  The main text has not explained how market power is actually determined.  As stated earlier, it 
is technically defined as having enough power so as to make something happen that would not happen in 
a competitive market, such as abnormally high prices or the exclusion of competitors.  Such power is said 
to be difficult to demonstrate directly, and so in antitrust practice market power is usually inferred through 
market share.  A company that controls some percentage of the market is presumed to have corresponding 
market power.  If company P has 80% of the snack peanut market, we might infer it has market power, 
while company Z with 3% does not. 
Of course, P’s 80% control of the “snack peanut” may sound impressive, but only if, in fact “snack 
peanuts” is actually a market.  It might be, in fact, that peanuts are in fierce competition with chips and 
pretzels.  Stated differently, if a peanut “monopolist” attempted to raise prices or otherwise manipulate the 
market, would consumers just turn to, or substitute, other products, like popcorn or chips?  If so, perhaps 
the “correct” market is actually “snack foods,” of which peanuts are just 10%, leaving P with just 8% 
market share.  Far from being a terrifying monopolist, he’s just peanuts.  For another general review, see 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (7th ed. 2013). 
The process just described is the process of “market definition,” and, as the snack food example 
should make clear, the definition of markets has a powerful influence on assessments of market power, 
which is the lynchpin of antitrust analysis.  While relevant to most antitrust cases, market definition is 
particularly important in merger analysis, which is a prediction of how companies will behave after a 
merger, and therefore one that weighs the final market shares quite heavily.    
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analysis requires that a plaintiff demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, which usually 
necessitates a demonstration of market power.115  Similarly, the Supreme Court has held 
that the offense of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act requires proof of 
monopoly power, which is taken as something beyond mere market power.116    
 
Of particular importance here is the role of the market and its definition in merger 
reviews conducted under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  The government is obliged to 
block or condition a merger if it predicts that allowing the merger will “substantially 
lessen competition.”117  In current practice, such a finding is usually premised on a 
prediction that the new entity will wield enough power after the merger so as to permit 
it to raise prices or restrain competition in a self-serving way.  Under the “Merger 
Guidelines” jointly published by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of 
Justice, that prediction is premised both on a series of presumptions (i.e., presumptions 
that the resulting market structure will be anticompetitive, like two companies merging 
to create a monopoly), along with economic arguments, usually price-focused, specific to 
the firms and industry in question.118  
 
As it stands, in nearly all antitrust cases these key questions are addressed by 
focusing on “cash” markets effects on prices.  Indeed, as numerous critics have written,119 
antitrust has become “price-fixated” or “price-centric.”  That is to say, antitrust faces 
great difficultly addressing forms of competition that do not turn on providing a cheaper 
product, and also has difficultly addressing harm that amounts to something other than 
the raising of prices to consumers.  Unfortunately, as the economy gets more complex, 
these are hardly the only forms of competition or harm.  It is with these problems in 
mind that I suggest that analysis of attentional markets might be helpful for some of the 
more pressing antitrust problems of our time. 
 
 
 
                                               
115 See, e.g., California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(describing typical rule of reason analysis). 
116 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[S]ize does not determine guilt… without having intended 
either to put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when none had 
existed; they may have become monopolist by force of accident.”). 
117 See 15 U.S.C § 18 (1988).  
118 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 111, at 5.3-5.4. 
119 See e.g., MAURICE STUCKE & ALLEN GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY, ch. 7 (2016); John 
M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015); Tim Wu, Taking 
Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 313, 328 
(2012). 
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e. Attention Markets in Merger Review – the Metric of Time 
 
One relatively simple way of measuring market power in attentional markets is to 
focus on the industry’s own metric:  time, or in the jargon, “time on site.” Time serves as 
a proxy for attention, given that one cannot usually determine whether consumers are 
actually attending to their screens when advertisements are displayed or how focused 
that attention is at any given moment.  This approach recognizes that some firms are at 
the junction of two markets – attention and cash markets – and appreciates that market 
power in attention markets can convey considerable power. 
 
Time on site is readily measurable, and already tracked by both industry and 
observers.  For example, a 2016 ComScore report suggests that Facebook had an average 
of over 1,000 monthly minutes per user, as compared with about 250 for Instagram and 
Snap, and less than 200 for Twitter and 50 for Google+.120  Relying on this data for 
hypothetical purposes, if consumers nationwide spent a total of some 2000 minutes per 
week total on all social media, and overall spent 55% of those hours on Facebook and 
12.5% on Instagram, we would have some sense of the structural importance of a 
Facebook-Instagram combination, which would, in this hypothetical, leave one company 
with 67.5% market share in the presumed social media market.  If those numbers were 
correct (likely they are not) the merger would be presumptively anti-competitive.121 
 
 Using time as the metric is not difficult and it helps show some of the limitations 
of other approaches, such as an exclusive focus on the markets for advertising alone, 
which has been the tendency of most antitrust observers.  As discussed above, the British 
competition office suffered from this exclusive focus on cash advertising markets.122   
That cash-market analysis made Instagram a non-entity; yet at the time of the merger it 
in fact already had a sizable share of social media attention, but had not yet converted 
that attention into advertising revenue.123  Hence Instagram and Facebook did not 
appear to be advertising competitors; yet this masked the fact that they were direct 
competitors for the attention spent on social media.  Also, as we’ve seen above it is 
typical for an Attention Broker to capture an audience at an earlier stage, and then later 
                                               
120 Comscore, 2016 Cross Platforms Future in Focus. The report does not give exact numbers. 
121 This conclusion is premised on the structural presumptions in 5.3 of the Horizontal Guidelines.   
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 111 (“Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that 
involve an increase in the HHI of between 100 points and 200 points potentially raise significant 
competitive concerns.”). 
122 See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.  
123 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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convert that audience into advertising revenue.124  In retrospect, that was exactly the 
strategy that Instagram pursued.  After gaining some 300 million users, it successfully 
introduced advertising in 2015 and began increasing the load thereafter.125   
 
f. Market Definition & Substitution Analysis 
 
It is well known by antitrust practitioners and scholars that defining the market in 
which power is alleged is a central and necessary step.  But how does one define 
attentional markets?  We simply assumed in the example above that “social media” is a 
market, but it might reasonably be asked if “social media” is the correct definition of the 
market that Facebook and Instagram were competing in.  In other words, are Instagram 
and Facebook competing with just social media platforms, like each other, Twitter, and 
Google+, or a much broader array of competitors, like all websites or maybe everything 
one spends time on?    
 
In current antitrust practice and under the guidelines followed by the agencies for 
merger review, the “market” for a product is defined by the economic concept of 
“substitution.”126  Two products are in the same market if consumers view them as 
economic substitutes – meaning that a rise in price of one product would make 
consumers switch to the alternative.127  Hence, two different brands of peanuts might be 
in the same market, but are not substitutes for beer.128  The question, then, is how we 
might assess what serves as a substitute for a product like Facebook, Instagram, Google 
search or other attentional economy mainstays.. 
 
The proposed answer relies on what I term an “attentional SSNIP test,” but before 
reaching that test it might be helpful to see how others have addressed the question.  
One approach comes from David Evans in work done for the Google case.129  Noting that, 
over a ten-year period, entire categories of sites became more or less popular (for 
                                               
124 See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text (describing Facebook’s strategy in the 2000s).  
125 Sapna Maheshwarijan, More Ads to Appear on Instagram, Now on ‘Stories’ Feature, N.Y.TIMES 
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/business/instagram-ads.html. 
126 As stated in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, “Market definition focuses solely on 
demand substitution factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away from one product 
to another in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in 
product quality or service.”  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 111.  
127 For a basic introduction to substitutes and complements, see, e.g., ARLEEN J. HOAG & JOHN H. 
HOAG, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMICS 65-66 (2006). 
128 The beer and salty snacks are “complements.”  See id. 
129 See David S. Evans, Attention to Rivalry among Online Platforms and its Implications for Antitrust 
Analysis (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 627, 2013). 
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example, social media became more popular, and web portals less), he presumed that 
users switch between different categories and concluded, therefore, that nearly 
everything on the web competing for attention is presumptively in the same market.130   
As he wrote: 
  
[A]ttention seekers compete with each other, at least to some degree, across even 
broadly defined products and service categories.  When one attention seeker gets 
more attention some other attention seeker is probably getting less.131 
 
The logic behind this assertion is as follows: if you begin using Facebook and therefore 
use Google less, Facebook must be successfully competing with Google.  But on closer 
examination this approach is extremely overbroad as a theory of substitution, and it does 
not tell us much that we need to know about competition in attentional markets. 
 
The main problem with Evan’s approach is that it defines the market so broadly 
that economists and antitrust authorities would immediately reject the definition as 
ridiculous in the context of a cash market.  Cash is also a limited resource, but that does 
not mean everything that costs money is a substitute.  It is true that, as household 
budgets are limited, families may dine out less if rents increase.  But that does not mean 
that housing and restaurants are in the same market, or that houses and restaurants are 
economic substitutes.  The fact that they are drawing on the same, limited resource, 
cannot make everything in the attentional markets substitutes in an economic sense. 
 
 An alternative – seen in the British approach to the Instagram-Facebook merger – 
is not much better: to focus exclusively on the markets for the resale of attention 
(advertising markets) and ask whether the two firms compete there.  This approach is 
too narrow because it fails to tell us what is happening in the consumer markets, which 
should presumptively be the most important.  As we’ve seen, the approach also misses 
competition for attention.132  It might be that advertisers see Google and Facebook as 
offering substitutes — i.e., digital ads that reach a certain demographic.  But that doesn’t 
necessary tell us whether consumers see the companies as substitutes or not.  A 
demographic such as men in their 30s might like spending time on both Google and 
Facebook, but we don’t know whether they view them as substitutes or not. 
 
                                               
130 Id. at 12. 
131 Id. 
132 See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.  
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A better alternative, proposed here, is to directly test substitutability in the 
attentional markets by examining how consumers react to an increase the “attentional 
price.”  In other words, the proposal is to find the attentional equivalent to the Small but 
Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test first implemented by F.M. 
Scherer and the Justice Department for merger review.133  The SSNIP test aims to test 
substitution by determining whether a hypothetical monopolist could profit from a price 
increase of 5% - 10% held for at least one year, where it is assumed all other product 
prices remained constant.  If sufficient buyers would likely switch to alternative products, 
making the price increase unprofitable, then the hypothetical market is not a relevant 
market for antitrust purposes. 
 
The attentional version of the SSNIP test tries to determine how consumer might 
react to a small but significant and non-transitory increase in the advertising load for a 
given product.  It might be conducted simply by adding advertising to a product in a 
non-transitory fashion, and determining whether that addition might make a significant 
number of consumers spend their time with a different product.  For example, if one 
added a very short, five second advertising video that played before every usage of 
Google search, would some number of consumers switch to Bing?  Presumably yes, 
meaning that Google search and Bing are substitutes and competitors.  But what if the 
additional load was added to all search engines – would consumers spend less time on 
search, and spend more time on Facebook or Twitter instead?  If not – if consumers 
continue using search, even at the new, higher attentional price – then this would 
suggest that search is, in fact, the right market definition, and that a hypothetical search 
engine monopolist is in a position to raise attentional prices. 
 
The attentional SSNIP is not the only way that attention market definition might 
be approached.  Another strategy might be just to survey users of Instagram and find out 
whether their use of the product took away from their time on Facebook.  One might 
also examine documents internal to the companies that suggest whom they view as 
competitors for attention, or examine whether or why a firm has been able to raise its 
attentional prices without apparent constraint from competitors.134  The point is merely 
                                               
133 The test is described in more detail in F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 517 (1980); see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 111. This builds 
directly on the approach suggested by Randal Picker. See Randal C. Picker, Online Advertising, Identity and 
Privacy (Univ. of Chi. John M. Ohlin L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 475, 2009). 
134 Google, for example, has increased the number of ads and placed ads in new places in its 
searches. See Ananya Bhattacharya, Google has been quietly placing more ads in search results, QUARTZ (Feb. 
2, 2017), https://qz.com/900349/google-goog-has-been-quietly-placing-more-ads-in-search-results/.  
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that a better approach to understanding who counts as “competitors” in the attention 
economy is needed if the agencies are to do their jobs effectively. 
 
* * * 
 
At bottom, in a world where so many important firms depend on attention 
markets, it is clear that in at least some cases, regulatory analysis of attentional markets 
might be useful or better than traditional cash market analysis.  The project is of some 
urgency, given the size of the companies in this area, and the number of mergers that are 
likely to occur, or have already occurred.135  As it stands, the major antitrust agencies do 
not have a handle on competition in the attention economy, and without one, they will 
be unable to effectively protect the public against undue consolidation, without 
hindering or preventing those mergers which benefit the public. 
 
It might be asked what, if any, might be the consequences of the identified blind 
spot for the public?  They are simply the harms from failing to protect the competitive 
process in regular markets.136  First, with less or limited competition, it is easier for 
dominant firms to raise prices, both in terms of cash and attention.  For consumers, this 
means that firms can impose heavier ad-loads for the same product; one need only 
compare the major web sites of 2010 with that of today to see that the advertising load 
has increased dramatically.137  Second, market power makes it easier for the firms to 
charge advertisers higher prices, which are ultimately passed on to the public.  Finally, 
the nullification of challenging competitors through mergers can threaten the process of 
innovation, which is, as most economists believe, of far greater potential magnitude than 
any price harms.138  In short, at its worst, an inability to grapple with power in attention 
markets poses the potential for allowing the persistence of the kind of monopoly 
dominance and stagnation that the antitrust laws were enacted to fight.    
 
B. The Protection of Captive Audiences 
 
I tremble for the sanity of a society that talks, on the level of abstract principle, of the 
precious integrity of the individual mind, and all the while, on the level of concrete 
                                               
135 See Lapo Filistrucchi et al., Market definition in two-sided markets: Theory and practice (TILEC 
Discussion Paper No. DP 2013-009, 2013). 
136 AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 5-10 (7th ed. 2013) (describing harms intended to be 
prevented by antitrust). 
137 See, e.g., Bhattacharya, supra note 134; Adam Levy, Hate ads on facebook? They’re about to get 
worse, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 19, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/hate-ads-facebook-getting-worse-557630. 
138 See Wu, supra note 119 at 313.  
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fact, forces the individual mind to spend a good part of every day under bombardment 
with whatever some crowd of promoters want to throw at it.139 
 
 - Charles Black, 1953 
  
The ubiquity of screens and devices might be the first thing that a visitor from 
another decade would notice about our times.  Whether carried in our hands, or found in 
a taxi, elevator, schoolhouse, waiting rooms and many other places, these screens can be 
hard to escape.  And while most of our usage of screens or phones is consensual – indeed 
a mainstay of socializing and work – some is not, yielding to new regulatory challenges. 
 
This section focuses on problems posed by the seizure of attention that is non-
consensual.  Such attentional seizure can happen in several ways.   First, over the last 
decade, non-consensual advertising has increased in volume and revenue thanks to the 
decreased prices of screens.  Consider, for example, the spread of “Gas Station TV” – that 
is, the televisions embedded in gasoline pumps that bring advertising to the captive 
pumper as he or she gets gas.140  As the CEO of Gas Station TV puts it, "We like to say 
you're tied to that screen with an 8-foot rubber hose for about five minutes."141  Second, 
as described earlier, agencies face situations where people are in enclosed, regulated 
spaces for long periods of times, like in airplanes, and must grapple with the rules for 
such situations.142 
 
Let us discuss non-consensual advertising first.  From the neurological research 
discussed above, it is clear that advertisements, when they use motion and sound, are 
extremely difficult if not impossible to ignore due to the involuntary responses of the 
brain.143  It is true that one might argue that we are responsible for placing ourselves in a 
position to be exposed.  That is why the most clearly non-consensual taking of attention 
happens when we are in situations where we are compelled to be there and are unable 
to escape – in the position that First Amendment jurisprudence refers to as being a 
“captive audience.”  The captive audience doctrine originated in the late 1940s in cases 
like Kovacs v. Cooper, which concerned a city ban on sound trucks that drove around 
                                               
139 Charles L. Black, Jr., He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 960, 962 (1953).  
140 See http://gstv.com.  
141 See Tom Walsh, Gas Station TV moves pumps more growth into downtown, DET. FREE PRESS (April 
12, 2015) http://www.freep.com/story/money/business/columnists/tom-walsh/2015/04/11/gasstation-
tv-gilbert/25527645/. 
142 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.  
143 See supra text accompanying notes 50 to 52. 
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broadcasting various messages at loud volume so as to reach both pedestrians and 
people within their homes.144  The Court wrote that “[t]he unwilling listener is not like 
the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it.  
… [H]e is practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy by loud 
speakers except through the protection of the municipality.”145  There are situations – on 
airplanes, at the gas pump, and so on – where one is simply incapable of escaping, as 
Black put it, “whatever some crowd of promoters want to throw at it.”146 
 
 It seems undeniable that at least some of the time we end up captive audiences, 
involuntarily subjected to sounds and images that we cannot ignore.  But does this really 
amount to more than a mere annoyance?  It might be protested that seconds, or at most 
minutes of seized attention are matters too trivial to be taken seriously by the law -- de 
minimis non curat lex.   
 
 Charles Black, addressing this very point – that non-consensual advertising was 
nothing more than “a bit of a fuss about nothing” – answered: 
 
Subjecting a man, willy-nilly and day after day, to intellectual forced-feeding on 
trivial fare, is not itself a trivial matter; to insist, by the effective gesture of 
coercion, that a man's right to dispose of his own faculties stops short of the 
interest of another in forcing him to endure paid-up banality, is not itself banal, 
but rather a sinister symbol of relative weighting of the independence of the mind 
of man and the lust to make a buck.147 
 
In other words, it really is an unfortunate thing to accept the idea that a seizure of time 
and mental facilities is a de minimus triviality.  Sure, we may waste plenty of time as it is, 
but at least it is ours to waste.  It is, in this sense, and as Black later argued,148 the 
deprivation of a liberty, more precisely liberty of thought, which is itself a constitutional 
value.  As Justice Cardozo put it, "[O]f that freedom one may say that it is the matrix, the 
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."149 
 
                                               
144 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
145 Id. at 86-87. 
146 Black, supra note 139.  
147 Black, supra note 139. 
148 See Black, supra note 139 at 963. 
149 Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). 
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But we might still insist on some more concrete demonstration of harm – some 
measure of value lost.  In this respect, as in the antitrust discussion, it helps to look at 
what the industry itself thinks.  For when look not at individual effect, but the aggregate 
effect, we find that the attention taken, without anything in exchange, is sometimes 
quite valuable.  We may observe, for example, that the non-consensual screen 
advertising (“digital out of home” in the jargon) claims some $12 billion per year in 
revenue.150  We also might also look at individual deals –  if Spirit Airlines earns a sum 
per flight by playing unavoidable in-seat advertising without the consent of its 
passengers, this provides a clear measure of the value of the attention which has been 
appropriated.  
 
Measured in more concrete terms it becomes easier to accept the concept known 
as “attentional theft.”151 A typical definition of theft or larceny is the taking of control of 
property or a resource “under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its 
economic value or benefit.”152  Here, the time taken has its economic value lost to the 
consumers and transferred to the airline for resale.  Conceptual support comes also from 
the common-law tort of conversion, which is currently defined by the Restatement as an 
intentional act of “dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with 
the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other 
the full value of the chattel.”153  In recent years, a number of courts have expanded the 
concept of conversion to reach purely intangible property or resources, like domain 
names, electronic computer data, and personal records.154  The point is not that anyone 
is actually criminally liable, or that a tort action would actually lie.  It is, rather, that the 
underlying concept of harm may support the adoption of policy designed to protect the 
resource. 
 
 Nor should this Essay be taken as suggesting that all display advertising – posters, 
television and so on – be barred as a seizure of attention.  Instead, it only suggests that 
the consent concept should be key for regulators who want to protect consumers from 
                                               
150 See PRWEB, Global Out-of-Home Media Revenues Up 6.2% in 2016 (Jan. 10, 2017) 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2016/12/prweb13943072.htm. 
151 See Tim Wu, The crisis of attention theft – ads that steal your time for nothing in return, WIRED 
(April 14, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/forcing-ads-captive-audience-attention-theft-crime/. 
152 N.Y. Penal Law § 155.00. 
153 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A(1) (1965).  
154 See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 8 N.Y.3d 283 (2007); Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 
1024, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law); Superior Edge, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 
44 F. Supp. 3d 890, 89 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1388 (D. Minn. 2014) (applying Missouri law); In re Yazoo 
Pipeline Co., L.P., 459 B.R. 636 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (applying Texas law). 
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non-consensual attentional theft.  Consent models are, of course, commonplace among 
legal regimes that regulate social interactions.  For example, when it comes to physical 
or sexual contact, consent is usually a defense to a battery or rape charge.155  Implicit 
consent forms an obvious model for thinking about intrusions upon attention, or more 
technically, upon the brain. 
 
 When it comes to attentional theft, we should construe implicit consent to apply 
broadly to most social contexts and exchanges.  By walking down the street, one should 
be understood to be necessarily consenting to seeing advertising posters and all manner 
of other involuntary attentional intrusions, from the sirens on fire trucks, to other 
people, to fast-moving cars.  And, as discussed earlier, we regularly agree to sell our 
attention by, for example, agreeing to watch advertising in exchange for "free" television 
programming.  Thus, our analysis should pay special attention to context and focus on 
situations where one becomes a captive audience.  
 
The approach explored here also gives regulators a means of thinking about rules 
for regulated environments, like airplanes, where passengers may subject each other to 
loud annoyances, like phone conversations.  For most of us, it is not hard, intuitively, to 
see why it might be annoying to spend an entire flight next to a man or woman who has 
chosen to spend the flight speaking loudly on his or her telephone.  But as we’ve seen 
above, consumer protection regulators, centered on the legal standard of policing “unfair 
and deceptive practices,”156 have struggled mightily to give consumers the protections 
that they obviously want.157 
 
Let us return to the specific example of what might justify banning telephony on 
passenger airline flights.  As discussed above, regulators already know that many 
passengers prefer the ban based on the premise that overheard phone conversations are 
irritating and annoying.158  Yet such concerns do not translate well into the formal logic 
or cost-benefit analysis that agencies depend on, which tends to depend on more 
concrete demonstration of injury or some form of deception.159 
 
                                               
155 See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 120.00, 130.05, 130.10. 
156 49 U.S.C. 41712 (Department of Transportation); 15 U.S. Code § 45 (Federal Trade 
Commission). 
157 See supra notes 32 to 39 and accompanying text.  
158 The comments are discussed in 81 Fed. Reg. 90258, supra note 33.  
159 See 81 Fed. Reg. 90258, supra note 33 (justifying the proposed rule on voice calls based on 
unfair and deceptive practices). 
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Armed with a better understanding of the science of attention, agencies might be 
in a better position to consider policy problems of this nature.  For example, in the 
airplane rulemaking, an agency consulting the relevant scientific literature might find 
particular reasons to ban telephone conversations.  Several studies have tested the effect 
of overheard half conversations (“a halfalogue”) on the attentional facilities.  In a study 
conducted at Cornell, subjects were asked to perform cognitive tasks while, in the 
background, a one-sided conversation was held; a control group listened to two-sided 
conversations or a monologue.  The study confirmed the hypothesis that the halfalogue 
“[drew] on limited attentional resources” resulting in “poorer performance in concurrent 
tasks.”  In short, there were cognitive impairments inflicted on victims by overheard 
phone conversations.160  And as the discussion of attention markets reveals, this is an 
injury with a known value, based on the value of attention in the economy.161  Such 
research may suggest alternative justifications for imposing a ban on telephone 
conversations in airplanes and other highly-confined regulated spaces.  Hence, both the 
science and economics of attention and cognitive degradation may be of use to 
regulators, like the Department of Transportation, who are actively considering such 
questions. 
 
One might hear the objection, once again, that the harm seems too exotic or 
minimal to take seriously.  But by way of comparison we might consider the story of 
second-hand smoke on airlines.  It was once common for passengers to smoke on planes, 
despite the fact that the smoke invariably spread to the entire airplane.  As early as 1969, 
groups petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration to impose limits on smoking 
aboard passenger aircraft, based on health effects.162  The agency, however, did not take 
the issue seriously, and through the 1980s airlines continued to have a smoking 
section.163 Despite evidence of harm to flight attendants,164 the idea of banning smoking 
on board was seen as impractical.  As regulator Dan McKinnon stated in 1984, 
"Philosophically, I think nonsmokers have rights, but it comes into market conflict with 
practicalities and the realities of life"; meanwhile, the airlines stressed that they were 
“unalterably opposed to any arbitrary and discriminatory ban on smoking.”165  However, 
                                               
160 See Emberson, supra note 43.   
161 See supra Section II.e.  
162 See MARTIN B. HOCKING & DIANA HOCKING, AIR QUALITY IN AIRPLANE CABINS AND SIMILAR ENCLOSED 
SPACES 311 (4th ed. 2005). 
163 See id. 
164 To Ban Smoking On Airline Aircraft: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. Comm. 
on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong. 1 (1989) at 390 (submission documenting health effects 
suffered by flight attendants). 
165 See id.  
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by the late 1980s, the weight of scientific evidence of harm finally convinced Congress to 
ban smoking on board.166  In retrospect, while perhaps no individual passenger died from 
being aboard a smoke-filled plane,  in the aggregate, the smoke was undeniably doing 
harm.  And once this was taken seriously, the political and social will necessary to ban 
smoking on planes became apparent.167  
 
The approach pioneered here, finally, helps justify laws already in existence that 
help protect the public against attentional seizure. Most municipalities, for example, 
have regimes that govern excessive noise, which protect people from noise while they are 
captive in their homes.   For example, the Los Angeles Municipal Code has a “Noise 
Regulation” section that prohibits “unnecessary, excessive and annoying noises from all 
sources.”168  The city has enacted complex regulations that, for example, require 
miniature golf operators to post signs “Requesting patrons to refrain from unnecessary 
noise.”169  New York City, surely one of the noisier cities in the world, has a complex set 
of noise regulations,170 such as a ban on honking in situations other than in response to 
actual dangers.  New York City's rules also ban some types of car alarms.171  Cities and 
states regulate highway billboards, and many ban digital billboards – billboards that 
change shape and sometimes flash in order to gain attention.  In particular, along 
interstates, such billboards were banned under the Highway Beautification Act of 
1965.172 
 
 These various laws were not, of course, enacted to protect attentional resources as 
discussed in this Essay, but for aesthetic reasons, or occasionally for public safety reasons 
                                               
166 Congress first banned smoking on domestic flights lasting less than two hours. Act of Nov. 21, 
1989, Pub. L. 101-164 (1989).  A full ban on smoking on airplanes took effect on June 4, 2000, under § 
708 of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 106-181 
(2000); see also Prohibition of Smoking on Scheduled Passenger Flights; Final Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 36771 
(June 9, 2000) (implementing § 708).  
167 See HOCKING, supra note 162. 
168 L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 11. 
169 See id. § 41.44(c). 
170 Many of which are not fully enforced. See Matt Flegenheimer, Stop the Honking? New York 
Suggests It’s a Lost Cause, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), 
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171 In 2004, New York City's city council passed a more comprehensive ban on the sale of car 
alarms, but the measure was vetoed. See Winnie Hu, City Council Ban Car Alarm Sales, but a Mayoral Veto 
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alarm-sales-but-a-mayoral-veto-looms.html?_r=0.  
172 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1965).  
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(like the ban on blinking highway bulletins).173  But they might be additionally and 
sometimes better justified as a protection of resources that belong to the public that are 
being appropriated without consent.  As with the evolution in thinking about public 
health, over time, and from that perspective, we may find that government is in some 
contexts doing far too little to protect us from the bombardment. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
It is a truism that law needs to constantly adapt to changing conditions, including 
technological, social, and economic changes.  Over the last half-decade, one of the most 
important yet most poorly understood changes has been the rise of centrally important 
firms like Google or Facebook whose business model is premised not on the sale of goods 
or services, but on the resale of attention.  But the rise of such firms is actually just a 
reflection of something even deeper – an ongoing transformation in our sense and 
understanding of value.  If value, as recently as a few decades ago, was understood to 
mainly subsist in physical objects, it has steadily shifted toward abstractions like 
intellectual property, data, and human attention.  This paper has discussed the 
challenges posed by just one of those abstractions.  Yet it stands to reason that as our 
conception of value becomes increasingly abstract, the kind of challenges identified by 
this paper will only grow in importance. 
 
                                               
173 See, e.g., Highway Beautification Act, Pub. L. 89-285 § 131(a) (1965) (“[T]he erection… of 
outdoor advertising signs… should be controlled in order to protect the public investment in such 
highways, to promote the safety and recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural beauty.”). 
